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trade costs.11 In any case, we note that in the previous phrase we used the word potential to
qualify the equilibrium, because we remember that trade costs must be compatible to positive
prices and quantities, which require expression (17) to be satisfied.
On the other hand, when λr = 1/2 the indirect utility diﬀerential in (28) is decreasing in λr,
and therefore we have an equilibrium at λr = 1/2 only when
∂ (∆VH(λr, ρ))
∂λr
¯¯¯¯
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Clearly, the previous inequality is true when the expression in square brackets is negative. We
observe that, when ρ < 1, this expression is depicted by a concave parabola in t with a0(ρ) < 0,
b0(0.5, ρ) > 0 and c0(0.5, ρ) < 0. Thus, the symmetric equilibrium is stable only for high and low
trade costs, provided that (17) is satisfied, while it is unstable for intermediate trade cost values.12
4 The competition eﬀect and the preference eﬀect in detail
In order to more deeply discuss the findings in the previous section, we recall that Ottaviano et
al. (2002) find that there are diﬀerent eﬀects which give rise to the agglomeration and dispersion
forces, whose interplay defines the properties of the equilibrium outcomes. These forces are the
dispersion force originated by the demand of immobile unskilled workers, and the agglomeration
force originated from the fact that a greater number of firms in a region implies that fewer varieties
are imported, and that equilibrium prices of all varieties sold in this region are smaller (competition
eﬀect on prices).
In this work, we show that these eﬀects are partially modified and enriched by the additional
force which is generated when ρ 6= 1. In particular, the centrifugal force generated by immobile
11 In particular, with ρ < 1, when λr = 1 and t = t∗, we know that ∆VH(1, ρ) > 0 if b0(1, ρ)2 > 4a0(ρ)c0(1,ρ)(bL+dLM) .
12 In particular, b0(0.5, ρ) = 2adLM +
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unskilled workers as well as the agglomeration force originated by the fact that fewer varieties are
imported are still at work in our case. However, the result that a larger number of firms located in
a particular region always implies lower equilibrium prices of all varieties sold in the same region
is no longer true. This diﬀerence arises because when ρ < 1 we have an additional centrifugal
force generated by the fact that equilibrium prices of all varieties sold in a region may increase,
rather than decrease, when λr increases because of the preference eﬀect on prices. An increase
in λr, therefore, has an ambiguous impact on prices of varieties sold in r, and the results of the
trade-oﬀ generated by the two above mentioned eﬀects is in favour of the preference eﬀect when
(19) is such that
∂p∗zr(λr, ρ)
∂λr
> 0 (30)
with z = r, s. Expression (30) is true only when the share of skilled workers in region r, λr, is
suﬃciently low that
lr ≡ (L+ 2λrHρ)2 <
4LaH(1− ρ)
dLMt
(31)
Note that we define the left hand side of (31) as lr. Expression (31) tells us that, when ρ < 1, the
prevalence of the dispersion force originated by an increase in the concentration of skilled workers
in region r can leave the predominance to the agglomeration force when the number of firms in
the region, positively related to λr, becomes suﬃciently high to reverse the inequality sign in (31).
Moreover, from (20) we are able to show that, when ρ < 1, there could be another dispersion
force which could dominate because when the number of firms in a region increases, prices in the
other region, in our example in region s, may decrease. In this case we would have the following
result
∂p∗zs(λr, ρ)
∂λr
< 0 (32)
with z = r, s. On the other hand, the opposite could be true when the competition eﬀect prevails,
with prices increasing as the number of firms decreases. Expression (32) is true when the share of
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skilled workers in region r, λr, is such that
ls ≡ (L+ 2(1− λr)Hρ)2 <
4LaH(1− ρ)
dLMt
(33)
Note that we define the left hand sides of (33) as ls.
We can clearly observe that both (31) and (33) identify a unique threshold value in correspon-
dence of which the inequality sign changes, which is given by
ϕ∗ = 4LaH(1− ρ)
dLMt
(34)
We observe that ϕ∗ is increasing in L, a, H and decreasing in dL, M , t and ρ. Moreover, we
notice that the threshold ϕ∗ would be nil (negative) if ρ were equal to 1 (larger than 1). In
other words, the case of prices decreasing in the region in which the number of firms and workers
increases would be absent not only when ρ = 1, as in Ottaviano et al. (2002), but also when
ρ > 1, because in this specific case, skilled workers’ preference for the consumption of the modern
good and variety is weaker than for unskilled workers. Thus, increasing the number of workers in
a particular region would reduce the aggregate preference for variety in that particular region and
this fact, together with the stronger competition due to the increase in the number of firms, would
end up by reducing prices even more and strengthening agglomeration forces. The additional
increase in agglomeration forces is originated by the second addend which we found in the square
brackets in (19).
Let us consider the case in which we are more interested; that is the case in which ρ < 1, because
it is more likely that skilled workers are more willing to consume the modern diﬀerentiated good
and more keen on having a greater variety in its consumption. In this case, a larger share of skilled
workers in region r may result either in higher or in lower prices of varieties sold in the same region.
Thus, there is a trade oﬀ originated by an increase in the share of skilled workers in a region. In
fact, on one hand this larger share is associated with a larger number of firms and, consequently,
with a stronger competition that tends to reduce prices in r. On the other hand, when ρ < 1, the
intensity of total demand for modern goods and diﬀerentiation in their consumption would also be
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stronger, and this tends to increase prices in r. The latter eﬀect dominates only if λr is suﬃciently
low that expression (31) is true, while the former dominates when λr becomes too high. In the
latter case, the larger share of skilled workers in r would be associated with a suﬃciently high
number of firms located in the same region whose increased competition would reduce prices in
r. Finally, we notice that the intensities of these two eﬀects, that is the competition eﬀect and
the preference eﬀect are, respectively, described by the two addends in the square brackets in
expression (19).
Moreover, we may deduce from (33) that if a certain number of skilled workers leaves region s,
there would be two other contrasting eﬀects in region s. On one hand, fewer skilled workers in s
mean a reduced preference intensity for the modern goods which would imply lower prices in s. On
the other, fewer skilled workers in s mean also fewer firms and less competition between the firms
left in the same region that would imply higher prices in region s. The result of these contrasting
eﬀects is an increase in prices in region s when a certain number of skilled workers leaves the
region only if the number of firms in s is suﬃciently low, that is only if λr is already suﬃciently
high. Again, we point out that the intensities of these two eﬀects, that is the competition eﬀect
and the preference eﬀect are, respectively, described by the two addends in the square brackets in
expression (20).
In summary, we may write that while the competition eﬀect is already present in the original
framework developed by Ottaviano et al. (2002), the preference eﬀect obviously arises only once
we allow for preference diﬀerences.
Let us continue with the case in which ρ < 1. We note that if a certain number of skilled
workers moves toward region r when λr is suﬃciently small that (31) and (33) are satisfied, both
the phenomena of higher prices in the region of destination, r, and of lower prices in the region
of provenience, s, are originated from the stronger preference that skilled workers have for the
consumption of the modern good and for the variety in its consumption. On the contrary, when
λr is suﬃciently high that (31) and (33) are not satisfied, both the phenomena of lower prices in
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the region of destination, r, and of higher prices in the region of provenience, s, are originated
from the stronger (weaker) price competition that firms face in a region where their number is
higher (lower).
Both lr and ls are convex parabola in the endogenous variable λr which are plotted in Fig.
3 for the relevant range of λr, that is [0, 1]. While lr is increasing in λr, ls is decreasing.13
Moreover, lr and ls intersect only once for λr ∈ [0, 1], when λr = 1/2, and they have the same
value when λr = (1−λr), that is when Hr = Hv. This allows us, to concentrate on the description
of what happens for λr ∈ [1/2, 1], because the opposite considerations are true for the other range
λr ∈ [0, 1/2].
Insert figure 3 about here
In Fig. 3 we also plot diﬀerent values of ϕ∗, which may vary according to many factors. In
particular, when ρ < 1, we have the following four kinds of potential cases depending on the
values of parameters in the models, which imply diﬀerent eﬀects of changes in λr on local, p∗zr,
and foreign, p∗zs, prices.
Case 1 When 0 ≤ ϕ∗ ≤ L2, the competition eﬀect on both local, p∗zr, and foreign, p∗zs, prices is
always stronger than the preference eﬀect, given that lr, ls > ϕ∗∀λr ∈ [1/2, 1]. Thus, an increase
in λr always results in a reduction in prices of varieties sold in r, with ∂p
∗
zr(λr,ρ)
∂λr < 0, and in an
increase in prices of varieties sold in s, with ∂p
∗
zs(λr,ρ)
∂λr > 0.
Case 2 When L2 ≤ ϕ∗ ≤ (L + Hρ)2, the competition eﬀect prevails on the preference eﬀect
for foreign prices, pzs, only if λr is not so high that ls < ϕ∗, with ∂p
∗
zs(λr,ρ)
∂λr > 0. However,
when the number of firms in region s is suﬃciently small to have ls < ϕ∗, prices in s, p∗zs, are
decreasing in λr because the small number of skilled workers in s reduces the pressure of demand
for manufacturing goods and diﬀerentiation in their consumption. On the other hand, when we
consider prices of varieties sold in region r, p∗zr, we note that lr > ϕ∗ ∀ λr ∈ [1/2, 1]. In this case,
prices in region r are declining in λr because in this region the number of firms is always suﬃciently
high to mitigate the strength of the preference eﬀect with respect to the stronger competition eﬀect.
Case 3 When ϕ∗ is higher, that is when it is such that (L + Hρ)2 ≤ ϕ∗ ≤ (L + 2Hρ)2, the
preference eﬀect on local prices, p∗zr, prevails on the competition eﬀect, but only provided that the
share of skilled workers in r is not too high to have lr > ϕ∗. Vice versa, the competition eﬀect on
local prices, p∗zr, prevails when the number of firms in region r is suﬃciently high that lr > ϕ∗.
13 It is simple to verify that the minimum of (31) is for λr = −L/(2ρH) < 0, and that the minimum of (33) is
for λr = (L+ 2Hρ) /(2Hρ) > 1.
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On the other hand, when we consider foreign prices p∗zs, the preference eﬀect does always prevail
on the competition eﬀect because ls < ϕ∗ ∀ λr ∈ [1/2, 1].
Case 4 Finally, when ϕ∗ is high enough that ϕ∗ > (L + 2Hρ)2, the preference eﬀect is always
stronger than the competition eﬀect, either on local prices, p∗zr, or on foreign prices, p∗zs.
Clearly, we may have many diﬀerent situations. For instance, when ϕ∗ is low, this could either
mean that skilled workers’ preference for manufactured goods and the variety in their consumption
is not that high (in other words ρ is not too low), or that L, H and a are suﬃciently low not to
have the preference eﬀect prevailing on the competition eﬀect. Moreover, it could also mean that
the number of goods produced, M , is suﬃciently high to reduce the relevance of the preference
eﬀect.
Finally, we observe that while changes in a, dL, M and t aﬀect only the value of ϕ∗, changes
in ρ aﬀect not only ϕ∗ but also lr and ls.
It is particularly important to observe that when the level of economic integration between
the two regions increases (trade costs fall), the value of ϕ∗ increases showing that the range of λr
for which the preference eﬀect dominates increases, strengthening the new dispersion force which
acts in the case in which ρ < 1.
In order to show how the final outcomes of all forces depend on the value of ρ, we plot in
Fig. 4 the indirect utility diﬀerential, ∆VH(λr), for diﬀerent values of ρ, that is for ρ = 0.96 and
ρ = 0.94. This allows us to underline that if ρ decreases an otherwise unstable symmetric outcome
may became a (stable) equilibrium because of the preference eﬀect that, with ρ < 1, acts as a
dispersion force.
Insert figure 4 about here
In the previous section we noted that economic integration, in the form of a reduction in
trade cost levels, may lead to an equilibrium with full agglomeration of the economic activity,
but this may happen only provided that trade costs are at intermediate levels. We also noted
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that, in any case, this would not be possible for suﬃciently low trade costs. In Fig. 5.a we plot
the indirect utility diﬀerentials, ∆VH(λr), for two diﬀerent values of trade costs t = 0.20 and
t = 0.19 when ρ < 1.14 In both cases the economy is characterized by two (stable) equilibria of
incomplete agglomeration and lower trade costs result in less agglomeration, because the weight
of the preference eﬀect, which acts as a dispersion force when ρ < 1, is reinforced by the reduction
in t.
Insert figures 5.a-5.b about here
Moreover, Fig. 5.b plots the “tomahawk diagram” which is used in NEG models to depict
the properties of equilibria for diﬀerent levels of trade costs. The diagram is drawn for the same
parameters used to obtain Fig. 5.a and it shows that the manufacturing sector is completely ag-
glomerated in a particular region when trade costs are high. However, when ρ < 1 and trade costs
decrease below ta, the dispersion force generated by demand pressures can suﬃciently increase
manufactured good prices in the more populated region to prevent full agglomeration and to have
asymmetric (stable) equilibria. Moreover, when trade cost decrease is much more sensible and
t < ts, then the action of the dispersion force will sustain the symmetric equilibrium characterized
by an even distribution of the economic activity. If we compare our results with those which would
be obtained by Ottaviano et al. (2002) with ρ = 1, we would get that, for the chosen parame-
ters and for the range of t values, full agglomeration would be the only possible kind of (stable)
equilibria. Hence, we are able to capture a new dispersion force which enriches the analysis.
Eﬀects on the balance between agglomeration and dispersion forces produced by the structure
of preferences are described by Puga and Venables (1996), where, however, preferences are ho-
mogeneous across individuals.15 They consider a new economic geography model where agents
14 The graphics are drawn for the following parameter values: H = 90, L = 50, a = 10, bL = 0.03, dL = 0.04,
f = 5 and ρ = 0.96. We remark that those parameters are compatible with positive prices and quantities. In
particular, according to (17) to have positive exports from region z to region v, we need to have t < 26.47.
15 In Puga and Venables (1996), pecuniary externalities, which eventually induces firms to agglomerate in a
region, are produced by forward and input linkages due to the input-output structure modeled as in Krugman and
Venables (1995) and in Venables (1996).
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consume a modern diﬀerentiated good and a homogeneous good. The latter good cannot be con-
sumed below a subsistence level. The assumption of non homotetic preferences gives rise to a
process of successive waves of industrialization in diﬀerent countries when there are exogenous
increases in the size of labor endowment. In fact, increases in labor endowments expand industry
more than the homogeneous sector because of the increases in wages in the country in which
industry is agglomerated. However, Puga and Venables (1996) use the particular version of the
monopolistic competition model developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and the assumption of
iceberg trade costs, with intersectorally mobile and internationally immobile workers. On the
contrary, we use the solvable model by Ottaviano et al. (2002), where our results derive from
heterogeneous preferences among diﬀerent kind of workers and not by the assumption of quasi
homotetic preferences. Moreover, we are able to capture changes of relative prices due not only
to the competition eﬀect but also to the specific heterogeneity in preferences.
Finally, we observe that, by considering the particular case of preference heterogeneity with
ρ < 1, we are able to find another channel through which we may reproduce the results by Helpman
(1997) or by Forslid and Wooton (2003). In fact, while in Helpman (1997) complete agglomeration
may be prevented by the increase in prices of non-traded goods which leads to stable asymmetric
equilibria, in Forslid and Wooton (2003) these equilibria arise for intermediate trade costs when
comparative advantage dominates on NEG agglomeration force. In our case, asymmetric equilibria
can be found because of the eﬀects that we described which are strictly related to the properties
of the demand side.
5 Conclusions
The dependence of equilibrium prices on the spatial distribution of consumers and workers has been
stressed by research in spatial pricing theory which, as Ottaviano et al. (2002, p. 410) point out,
“shows that demand elasticity varies with distance while prices change with the level of demand
and the intensity of competition”. In order to capture this evidence, Ottaviano et al. (2002)
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